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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and the European Economic Community
(EEC)1 for years have been trying to protect their domestic indus-
tries by preventing foreign goods from being "dumped" onto do-
mestic markets. While a precise definition is elusive, dumping gen-
erally involves exporting goods below market prices in the
exporting country in an effort to weaken competition and promote
sales on the foreign market.2 Such practice is condemned if it
causes injury to the particular industry of the importing country.
This Article analyzes and compares the United States and the
EEC antidumping laws, addresses the problems of each, and offers
proposals for a comprehensive approach to such laws.
In the United States, the Departments of Treasury and Com-
merce and the International Trade Commission (ITC) implement
antidumping duties. Under the Tariff Act of 1930 (Tariff Act),3 as
amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Trade Agreements
Act)," the Secretary of Treasury or Commerce determines whether
merchandise is sold in the United States at less than fair value.5 If
the Secretary renders an affirmative determination, the ITC deter-
mines whether an industry has been materially injured.
In the EEC, the Treaty of Rome authorizes the Commission of
the European Communities (Commission),' to implement an-
tidumping measures.7 These treaty provisions, however, are vague
and incomplete. 8 Thus, in the wake of the Tokyo Round of 1979'
The Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 297-98 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Rome], established the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC is currently com-
posed of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
2 3 H. SMITH & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY 368 (1985).
' Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§
1671-1677 (1982)).
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1982). This Act repealed the
United States Antidumping Act of 1921, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171.
" See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6 For the composition and duties of the Commission of European Communities, see the
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 155-63.
1 Article 91 regulated dumping between member states during the transitional period of
the Treaty, which has ended. Article 113 authorizes the Commission to police dumping
originating from non-member countries as a matter of general trade policy. See H. SMITH &
P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at 371.
8 Id.
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and the GATT Antidumping Code,10 the EEC Council" adopted
the current EEC antidumping law, Council Regulation 3017/79
(EEC Antidumping Regulation). 2
II. IMPOSITION OF ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
To impose antidumping duties in the United States, section 731
of the Tariff Act requires that:
(1) the administering authority [determine] that a class or kind
of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the
United States at less than its fair value, and
(2) the Commission [determine] that(A) an industry in the
United States - (i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened
with material injury, or (B) the establishment of an industry in
the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of
that merchandise .... 13
The "administering authority" of subsection (1) and the "Commis-
sion" of subsection (2) refer to the Secretary of Treasury or Com-
merce and the International Trade Commission, respectively. 4
The Tariff Act dumping definition differs from the GATT defini-
tion in only two respects.' 5 First, the United States definition does
not require that the product actually be sold in the United States.
The GATT formula does not contain similar language of "likely to
be sold," but instead requires that the product is "introduced into
the commerce of another country."' 6 Second, the United States
provision uses "fair" value, while the GATT Code uses "normal"
value.' 7
' The Multilateral Trade Negotiations, sponsored by GATT, commenced in 1973 in To-
kyo, Japan and thus are referred to as the "Tokyo Round."
"0 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. VI.
" For the composure and duties of the EEC Council, see the Treaty of Rome, supra note
1, arts. 145-54.
32 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 1 (1979).
,s 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1)-(2) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 207.2(b) (1953); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.35-.36
(1985). The function of the Secretary of the Treasury for less than fair value determinations
was transferred to the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, §
5(a)(1)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,275, 93 Stat. 1381. See also Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v.
United States, 515 F. Supp. 780 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981) (Department of Treasury as adminis-
tering authority); Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1077 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1980) (Department of Commerce as administering authority).
"5 See H. SMITH & P. HERZOG, supra note 2, at 368-69.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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The EEC formulation is substantially similar to both the United
States and GATT valuations. The EEC Antidumping Regulation is
divided into eighteen articles and does not provide a one para-
graph formula. Instead, each article addresses a specific topic. Arti-
cle 2.2 provides that a product is dumped "if its export price to the
Community is less than the normal value of the like product."18
Article 5.1 provides that "[any natural or legal person . . . acting
on behalf of a Community industry which considers itself injured
or threatened by dumped or subsidized imports may lodge a writ-
ten complaint."1 9 Article 4.1 states that "[a] determination of in-
jury shall be made only if the dumped or subsidized imports are
• . .causing or threatening to cause material injury to an estab-
lished Community industry or materially retarding the establish-
ment of such an industry."20 These three articles provide the basis
of the EEC dumping formula and contain essentially the same ele-
ments as the United States formula: imported price less than nor-
mal/fair value, material injury or threat thereof to industry or
retarding the establishment of industry, and a causal link between
the dumped product and injury. In both the EEC and United
States formulas, one must determine the meaning of a "normal" or
"fair" value and the meaning of "material" injury.
III. FAIR/NORMAL VALUE
A. Fair Value Under United States Law
While the Tariff Act does not define "fair value," value has been
historically considered "fair" if the purchase price or the exporter's
sales price exceeds the foreign market value.2 1 Similarly, the legis-
lative history of the Trade Agreements Act suggests that "fair
value" should be determined by comparing the exporter's domestic
price with the exporter's third country market price.22 Use of these
two formulas would thus bear similar results. For both valuations,
the exporter's price to the United States would be compared with
the exporter's domestic price.
Section 353.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations similarly pro-
18 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 2 (1979).
19 Id. at 7.
20 Id. at 6.
2' Antidumping Act of 1921, supra note 4, at § 161.
21 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 423 [hereinafter cited as 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws].
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vides that "fair value. . . is intended to be an estimate of foreign
market value. '23 This approach, therefore, requires a determina-
tion of the "foreign market value." Similarly, both the Code of
Federal Regulations and the Tariff Act provide for foreign market
value determinations.
Under section 773 of the Tariff Act, the foreign market value
embodies the price, at the time of exportation to the United
States, at which such merchandise is sold in the usual wholesale
quantities for home consumption. 4 If, however, the quantity sold
to the United States is so small as to risk an inadequate compari-
son to other countries, then the export price with other countries
will be used.26 The Code of Federal Regulations promulgates these
two valuations under sections 353.3 and 353.4, respectively.2 6 As a
consequence, the resulting foreign market value is recognized as
the "fair" value.
This foreign market valuation system, however, is ineffective
where the merchandise is produced in a nonmarket economy
(NME) country.27 In a NME country, the state controls the. econ-
omy and product price; thus, the "fair value" is not determined by
the market economy. In Bicycles from Czechoslovakia,28 the Trea-
sury Department first noted dumping from a NME country and
established a fair value by referring to the prices of similar mer-
chandise produced in non-Communist market economies. The
market economy prices thus served as a surrogate foreign market
value. 9
This form of surrogate pricing, however, proved inappropriate in
Electric Golf Cars from Poland; Antidumping."0 This case in-
volved golf carts manufactured in Poland exclusively for export to
the United States; Poland exhibited no domestic market nor a
third country market. The Treasury Department initially relied
upon a Canadian producer for a surrogate foreign market value.
When the Canadian producer, the only large-scale producer
3 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1985).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (1982).
25 Id.
"0 19 C.F.R. § 353.3-.4 (1985).
" For a complete discussion of United States antidumping law with respect to NME
countries, see Horlick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumpingi
Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807 (1984).
Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 6657 (1960).
29 Id.
"0 40 Fed. Reg. 25,497 (1975); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D.
Del. 1978).
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outside the United States, subsequently went out of business, the
Treasury suddenly needed a new standard of fair value for these
NME products. The Treasury thus developed a "constructed
value" whereby Polish materials were valued at prices prevailing in
Spain - a country of similar economic development." The Trea-
sury Department adopted this home-market surrogate approach as
a formal regulation in 1978.32
Although Congress disapproved the Treasury regulation,33 con-
gressional reenactment of section 205(c) of the Antidumping Act of
1921, implemented in the Trade Agreements Act, 3' provided simi-
lar results. The Trade Agreements Act substantially reenacted sec-
tion 205(c) as section 773(c) of the Tariff Act. 5 This section pro-
vides that state-controlled economy prices shall be determined by
either domestic or export prices of a market economy, or by the
constructed value of similar merchandise in a market economy.3"
Subsection (e) enumerates the method for determining "con-
structed value. '37 Basically, the constructed value includes the sum
of the cost of materials and production, general expenses and
profit, and the cost of all containers. The constructed or foreign
market value, then, is considered the "fair" value.38
As previously noted, both GATT and the EEC use "normal"
value rather than "fair" value in antidumping determinations. 9
These terms, however, are similar and interchangeable, as indi-
cated by the legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act.' 0 Ar-
ticle 2 of the EEC Antidumping Regulation provides a comprehen-
sive normal value determination procedure."'
B. Normal Value Under EEC Law
Under article 2.3 of the EEC Antidumping Regulation, the nor-
mal value for a product, is the price for a like product 42 in the
31 Outboard Marine Corp., 461 F. Supp. at 384.
32 See Antidumping Investigation Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921, 43 Fed.
Reg. 35,262 (1978). See also Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27, at 811.
33 See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27, at 813.
1 See supra note 4.
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
" Id.
37 Id. at § 1677b(e).
3Id.
31 See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
40 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 22, at 425.
1' 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 3 (1979).
41 Id. at art. 2.12. Article 2.12 defines "like product" as one which is identical to the
[Vol. 15:453
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domestic market of the exporting country.43 If there are no sales on
the domestic market, then the price of the product when exported
to a third country shall be used. A constructed value, similar to
that used in the United States, may also be utilized."
In addition, article 2 contains special provisions for imports from
NME countries. Again, the EEC Antidumping Regulation is al-
most identical to the United States law. Article 2.5 provides that
NME country prices may be determined either by domestic or ex-
port prices of a market economy or by constructed value of the like
product in a market economy third country.45 Unlike United
States law,' however, if neither of these valuations provide an ade-
quate basis, under the EEC Antidumping Regulation the price
paid or payable to the Community may be used.' 7
C. Constructed Value
While both the United States and the EEC laws employ con-
structed values, the United States law is far more specific about
their formulation. Section 773(e)(1) of the Tariff Act provides that
the amount for general expenses shall not be less than ten percent
of the cost as defined.' The amount for profit shall not be less
than eight percent of the sum of such general expenses and cost.
Section 773(e)(1) also includes the cost of containers and cover-
ings, while the EEC Antidumping Regulation does not. Although
the EEC Antidumping Regulation does not provide similar floor
limits for percentage of profits and/or expenses, the EEC Commis-
sion recently utilized a fictitious profit of eight percent in the Jap-
anese Ballbearings.4'9 No profits were reportedly gained from sales
of the product in the home market.
D. Sales Below Cost of Production
The United States and the EEC laws have virtually identical
provisions addressing the situation where prices in the domestic
product under consideration.
40 Id. art. 2.3.
44 Id.
46 Id. art. 2.5.
"' See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
" 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 3 (1979), art. 2.5. The product price may be adjusted, if
necessary, to include a reasonable profit margin.
,s 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1) (1982).
4' Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185 [1978-79
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. Rp. (CCH) 1 8574.
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market of the exporting country are less than the cost of produc-
tion. Both the United States and the EEC disregard such prices if
the sales: "(1) have been made over an extended period of time
and in substantial quantities, and (2) are not at prices which per-
mit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time in the
normal course of trade." 50 As to alternative valuations, however,
the United States and the EEC differ. Under section 773 (b) of the
Tariff Act, the administering authority is to employ the con-
structed value of the merchandise to determine its foreign market
value.51 Under article 2.4 of the EEC Regulation, however, the nor-
mal value may be determined on the basis of: (1) the remaining
sales on the domestic market made at a price above the production
costs; (2) export sales to third countries, based on constructed val-
ues; or (3) an adjusted sub-production-cost price which would
eliminate loss and provide for a reasonable profit.5
IV. INJURY DETERMINATION
A. United States
As previously mentioned, both the United States and EEC laws
require a material injury to the importing industry for the imposi-
tion of antidumping duties.53 Under section 731 of the Tariff Act,54
the ITC is the authority responsible for determining whether a do-
mestic industry has been materially injured or threatened with ma-
terial injury, or whether the establishment of an industry is mate-
rially retarded in the United States. 55 The crucial tasks, therefore,
are determining what constitutes a domestic industry, a material
injury, and a threat of material injury.
1. Domestic Industry
Section 771(4)(A) defines industry as "the domestic producers as
a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective out-
put of the like product constitutes a major proportion of the total
domestic production of that product." 6 Subsection 10 defines "like
product" as "a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most
" See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982); 22 O.J. Eu. COMM. (No. L 339) 3 (1979), art. 2.4.
" 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982).
"' 22 O.J. EuR COMM. (No. L 339) 3 (1979), at art. 2.4.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 13, 19, 20.
- 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
" See supra text accompanying note 13.
" 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1982).
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similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an
investigation . . .,,57 With such generally defined terms, the ITC
holds great discretionary power. One commentator notes that the
ITC will examine not only the characteristics and uses of the prod-
ucts, but also such factors as whether the products will compete
with one another in the marketplace.58 For example, in Motorcycle
Batteries From Taiwan,5 0 six-volt batteries manufactured in the
United States were not considered "like products" for imported
Taiwanese six-volt batteries because the two were not commer-
cially interchangeable.6
The actual scope of a "domestic industry" must also be deter-
mined. In appropriate circumstances, a regional industry may suf-
fice for purposes of the Tariff Act. 1 Under subsection (4)(C), a
material injury may be found for a regional industry if: (1) the pro-
ducers within such market sell all or almost all of their production
of the like product in that market; and (2) the demand in that
market is not supplied, to any substantial degree, by producers of
the product located elsewhere in the United States.2 For example,
in Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States,63 "industry" did not
mandate inclusion of the entire domestic cast-iron soil pipe indus-
try; the regional industry of California proved sufficient.6
2. Material Injury
Section 771(7)(A) defines material injury as "harm which is not
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 65 In determining
whether a material injury has occurred, the ITC considers the vol-
ume of imports, the effect of imports on United States prices for
like products, and the impact of imports on domestic producers. 6
.No single factor, however, is given decisive effect in determining
whether a material injury has occurred. 7
11 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982).
" See Victor, Injury Determinations by the United States International Trade Com-
mission in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
749, 751 (1984).
11 Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan; Import Investigation, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,609 (1982).
60 Id.
6o 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(C) (1982).
62 Id.
63 Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961).
Id. at 311.
, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982).
Id. at § 1677(7)(B).
67 See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 916, 922 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
1985]
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a. Volume
Section 771(7)(C)(i) provides only that the ITC shall consider
whether the volume of imports "is significant. 6 8 Because of the
vagueness of the statute, the ITC again is vested with broad discre-
tionary authority, which the United States Court of International
Trade only reluctantly overrides. 9 In SCM Corp. v. United
States,70 the ITC held, and the Court of International Trade af-
firmed, that significant market penetration by a product at less
than fair market value alone is an insufficient basis for finding in-
jury.71 The ITC must also consider pertinent economic and finan-
cial criteria, including the health of the domestic industry.72
Factors that the ITC considers "significant" will thus vary ac-
cording to the circumstances of each case. In fact, Congress has
suggested that the same volume of imports might have a signifi-
cant impact on one market and an insignificant impact on an-
other. 7 For example, in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, "
the Court of International Trade approved the ITC's significant
injury determination where the maximum volume of sugar imports
was only 4.5% of the primary distribution. 75
b. Prices
In evaluating the effect of imports on United States prices, sec-
tion 771(7)(C)(ii) requires that the ITC consider whether the im-
ports significantly undercut United States prices and whether the
effect of the imports significantly depresses prices or prevents price
increases.76 In Atlantic Sugar, Ltd., evidence that domestic pro-
ducers were compelled to substantially lower their prices to meet
import competition was sufficient to represent price depression to
a "signficant" degree.77 In SCM Corp., however, the ITC rejected
the notion that Japanese portable electric typewriters, imported at
- 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i) (1982).
69 "[It is not the function of the Court in reviewing an injury determination of the Com-
mission under the Antidumping Act to weigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment for
that of the Commission." SCM Corp. v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 194, 199 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1982).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 See H.R. RmP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1979).
7' Atlantic Sugar, Ltd., 419 F. Supp. at 916.
7 Id. at 922.
76 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(ii) (1982).
77 Atlantic Sugar, Ltd., 519 F. Supp. at 922.
462 [Vol. 15:453
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less than fair value, suppressed the United States price for such
typewriters. 78 Although the ITC found that Japanese imports
achieved between twenty-one percent and thirty-seven percent of
the United States market over four years, the imported typewriters
increased in price at a pace similar to office typewriters.79
c. Impact
In evaluating the impact of imports on the affected industry,
section 771(7)(C)(iii) of the Tariff Act requires the ITC to con-
sider, inter alia: (1) actual and potential decline in output, sales,
market share and profits; (2) factors affecting domestic prices; and
(3) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories,
wages and growth.80 For consideration of these factors, as in the
case of volume and price determinations, the ITC must work on a
case-by-case basis. In Atlantic Sugar, Ltd.,81 the Court of Interna-
tional Trade noted that neither trends in economic indicators nor
profit or loss statements provide decisive guidance in determining
material injury.8 2 In Atlantic Sugar, Ltd., the ITC noted two in-
stances where material injury occurred despite questionable eco-
nomic indicators.8 3 First, the ITC found injury due to substantial
losses incurred by the producer, even though the producer's losses
decreased over time and several other indicators improved.84 Sec-
ond, the ITC found injury due to a decline in economic indicators
over the period of investigation, even though the producer realized
profits during that time. 5
In SCM Corp., however, the economic indicators worked against
the producer. While the percentage of the market captured by Jap-
anese imports increased over the four-year period, the market
share for all imports decreased over the same time.86 Consequently,
SCM's sales increased dramatically, both relative to imports and in
absolute terms.8 7 Thus, both the ITC and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade determined that the sales losses were not significant
"' SCM Corp., 544 F. Supp. at 200.
79 Id.
80 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1982).
81 Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 1055 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
Id. at 1059.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
SCM Corp., 544 F. Supp. at 201.
87 Id.
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enough to justify a material injury."s
3. Threat of Material Injury
The Tariff Act does not delimit criteria for assessing a threat of
material injury. The legislative history of the Act provides little
guidance, stating only that threat of material injury "must be
based upon information showing that the threat is real and injury
is imminent. . . ."8 Recent case law thus provides the only direc-
tion in determining what constitutes a viable threat of material
injury.
In Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States,90 the United
States Tariff Commission (now the ITC) declared that minimal
legislative guidance in this area suggested that Congress intended
the Commission to possess wide latitude in determining threat of
injury.91 In his negative determination of injury, the Tariff Com-
missioner offered that "[ffor there to be likelihood of injury, there
must be a realistic connection between a situation that presently
exists and what will probably happen should the present situation
continue. A trend that indicates future injury must be shown." 92 In
this case, while the operating margins of some domestic producers
decreased, the influencing factors were deemed to be purely do-
mestic in origin. The Customs Court thus concluded that Congress
intended "injury" to encompass more than de minimis injury.9 3
In Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. United States,94 the leading
"threat of injury" case, the Court of International Trade reiterated
Congress' real threat/imminent injury test."6 The court overturned
an ITC affirmative determination of threat of injury because the
ITC speculated that an increase in the exporter's capacity would
increase the likelihood of domestic injury.91 The court reasoned
that a mere possibility that an injury might occur does not satisfy
the "real and imminent" threat test mandated by Congress.97
" Id.
89 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 22, at 474-75.
9' Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 312 (Cust. Ct. 1980).
91 Id. at 321.
" Id. at 325.
" Id. at 329.
" Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc., 515 F. Supp. at 780.
, Id. at 790.
Id. at 791.
9Id.
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B. EEC
The EEC Antidumping Regulation does not define what consti-
tutes an "injury" or the extent of harm necessary to impose an-
tidumping duties. Article 4.1 of the EEC Antidumping Regulation
simply provides that "[a] determination of injury shall be made
only if the dumped . . . imports are . . . causing or threatening to
cause material injury to an established Community industry or
materially retarding the establishment of such an industry."' The
history behind the adoption of this language is worth noting.
Under the 1968 EEC Antidumping Regulation,99 the Commis-
sion required dumping to be the principal source of the injury.100
At this time, the EEC and the United States differed as to the
extent of injury necessary to impose antidumping duties.1"' The
EEC considered that the dumping injury should be greater than
the cumulative injuries to the EEC industry caused by all other
factors.102 The United States, however, considered that a material
injury need only be one "which is not inconsequential, immaterial,
or unimportant. '" 10 3 Hence, Congress did not include any language
of injury relative to other factors when it amended the Tariff Act
through the Trade Agreements Act. Consequently, the EEC abro-
gated any notion of relative injury in the 1979 EEC Antidumping
Regulation.'0 Both the United States and the EEC, thus maintain
the "material injury" standard for imposing antidumping duties.
While the EEC did not adopt the United States material injury
definition, the EEC Antidumping Regulation incorporated the
Tariff Act evaluation criteria. For injury determinations, article 4.2
of the EEC Antidumping Regulation requires an evaluation of vol-
ume, prices, and impact. 105 The slight variations between the lan-
guage of the EEC Antidumping Regulation and the United States
Tariff Act are insignificant.
Unlike the United States statutes, the EEC Antidumping Regu-
lation contains guidelines for determining threat of material injury.
Article 4.3 provides that a viable threat of injury is considered to
18 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 6 (1979).
" 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 393) 1 (1968).
'o See Didier, EEC Antidumping Rules and Practices, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 349, 359
(1980).
103 Id.
102 Id.
'13 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
" See Didier, supra note 100, at 360.
108 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 6 (1979).
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exist only where a particular situation is likely to develop into ac-
tual injury.010 As relevant factors, the Regulation cites:
(a) rate of increase of the dumped or subsidized exports to the
Community;
(b) export capacity in the country of origin or export, already in
existence or which will be operational in the foreseeable future,
and the likelihood that the resulting exports will be to the Com-
munity; and
(c) the nature of any subsidy and the trade effects likely to
arise therefrom. 107
If Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. is precedent for threat of injury,
then EEC Antidumping Regulation 4.3(b) is at odds with United
States law.10 8 In Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc., the United States
Court of International Trade explicitly rejected the EEC An-
tidumping Regulation article 4.3(b) standard for determining
threat of injury - potential export capacity. As previously noted,
such a possibility does not meet Congress' "real and imminent"
test."19
V. REMEDIES
A. United States
1. Antidumping Duties
Section 731 of the Tariff Act requires the ITC, upon finding a
material injury caused by dumped imports, to impose an an-
tidumping duty upon such imports.110 The duty should equal the
amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United
States price for the imports.1 While the Act provides no further
guidance, case law requires that the duties imposed be uniformly
assessed throughout the United States, wherever the imports enter
the market.11 2
106 Id.
107 Id,
See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
'"See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
10 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
11 Id.
.. See Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 477 F. Supp. 201 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (national
industry may be injured if injury is experienced in only a portion of its market); Imbert
Imports, Inc. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1400 (Cust. Ct. 1971) (dumping duties apply to
every port of entry, not just port where injury caused).
[Vol. 15:453
U.S.-E.E.C. ANTIDUMPING
2. Countervailing Duties
As an alternative to imposing antidumping duties, section 701 of
the Tariff Act may be relied upon to impose countervailing du-
ties '" 3 in particular circumstances." The circumstances warrant-
ing imposition, however, are somewhat different from the circum-
stances warranting antidumping duties. Countervailing duties may
be imposed only where the exporter receives some form of subsidy
from the exporter's government. '" This subsidy, of course, often
decreases the exporter's price to less than fair value, and results in
dumping. The countervailing duty, similar to the antidumping
duty, is equal to the amount of the net subsidy.11
3. Escape Clause
Under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, temporary action
may be taken to arrest imports causing "serious injury" to a
United States competing industry. 117 To initiate escape clause 18
proceedings, an industry representative must petition the ITC for
an investigation.' 19 If the ITC investigation reveals serious injury,
it imposes duty or import restrictions necessary to prevent or rem-
edy such injury.1 20 The ITC then submits its findings and recom-
mendations to the President of the United States. 121 If the Presi-
dent rejects the ITC recommendations, 22 the ITC action may still
be upheld if Congress overrides the presidential veto. 23
B. EEC
The EEC Antidumping Regulation provides remedies that the
Commission may impose for dumped imports. 12 4 The remedies in-
clude price undertakings, provisional duties, an definitive duties. "
For a good discussion of subsidies and countervailing duties, see Jackson, United
States - EEC Trade Relations: Constitutional Problems of Economic Interdependence,
16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 453, 465-68 (1979).
"' 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1982).
I's Id.
116 Id.
"11 Id. at § 2251.
"8 See Jackson, supra note 113, at 468.
. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
120 Id.
121 Id.
"I For permissible presidential actions, see id. at § 2252.
12S Id. at § 2253.
"1 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 11 (1979).
125 Id.
1985] 467
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The amount of the duties shall not exceed the dumping margin
provisionally estimated or finally established.126
1. Price Undertakings
Price undertakings are confidential agreements between the for-
eign exporter and the Commission to increase the exporter's prices
to the EEC sufficiently to offset the injury.'27 Article 10.1 of the
EEC Antidumping Regulation provides, where undertakings are
offered which the Commission considers acceptable, that the an-
tidumping proceedings may be terminated without the imposition
of provisional or definitive duties.28 Where the Commission be-
lieves the undertaking is violated, it shall reopen the proceedings
and may impose provisional measures. 2 9
2. Provisional Duties
Article 11.1 of the EEC Antidumping Regulation provides that
the Commission may impose provisional duties where preliminary
examination shows evidence of dumping and injury. 30 The Com-
mission implements provisional action by accepting imports condi-
tionally upon the collection of security for the amount of the provi-
sional duty. 3 1 Provisional duties have a maximum period of six
months' validity, including extension time. 32 Once this period ex-
pires, the security shall be released to the extent the EEC Council
has decided definitely not to collect it. "
3. Definitive Duties
Article 12.1 provides that definitive antidumping duties shall be
imposed where dumping and injury are established.' " The Coun-
cil, acting under recommendation of the Commission, makes this
final determination.13 5 Article 13.4 provides that both provisional
126 Id.
,1" See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27, at 815; 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 9
(1979), at art. 10.2(b).
Il 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 9 (1979).
129 Id. at 10.
13o Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
13 Id.
135 Id.
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and definitive duties shall not be imposed retroactively. 36
VI. PROBLEMS/PROPOSALS
A. Dumping Results Often Unpredictable
In both United States and EEC antidumping proceedings, re-
sults are uncertain and subject to abuse.137 In terms of definitions,
the United States statutes do not define or provide guidelines for
"threat of injury" or "fair value."' 8 Similarly, the EEC Antidump-
ing Regulation does not define "injury" or "material injury."'3 9
Secondly, uncertainty abounds in proceedings against NME
countries.140 Commentators note that importers cannot ascertain
which country will be selected as a surrogate for the NME and
therefore cannot adjust their prices to insure compliance with an-
tidumping laws.' 4 ' This selection of a surrogate is also open to
abuse because the administering authority could make the selec-
tion based on political, rather than economical considerations."'
One proposal offered to circumvent the surrogate country prob-
lem in the United States is the "Heinz bill.' 4 Under this bill, the
Commerce Department would avoid selection of surrogate coun-
tries and instead look strictly to United States producers' prices.14
The base price would be the lowest average price in the United
States charged by exporters from any free market economy coun-
try.' The dumping margin would be the difference between the
NME producer's price and the base price." 6 Such a proposal also
could be implemented effectively by the EEC Commission.
B. Currency Convertibility
Another problem existing in connection with NME countries is
the inconvertibility of NME currencies. Without an accurate rate
" Id. at 11.
See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27, at 817.
11 See supra notes 21-22, 89 and accompanying text.
,8, See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 27-32, 45-47 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 147-48 and
accompanying text.
"I See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27, at 817.
141 Id.
14. Id. at 832. The conference committee failed to act on the bill, thus it was dropped
from the agenda at the end of the 1984 congressional session.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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of exchange, neither domestic producers nor NME producers can
determine appropriate import prices. 14 7 Moreover, if exchange
rates are constantly fluctuating, "currency dumping" may occur.14 8
For example, suppose the dollar devaluates against a foreign cur-
rency from month A to month B. The exporter's prices to the
United States suddenly are lower than its domestic prices, result-
ing in a technical case of dumping. If the exporter raises its export
price to the United States, however, it loses its naturally gained
competitive edge. Both the EEC Commission and the United
States administering authorities place currency dumping under the
purview of their respective antidumping provisions.4 9
Some commentators have suggested applying a "true" exchange
rate to remedy the problem of NME currency rates."" Under this
proposal, the administering authority would construct a stable ex-
change rate and publicize its rates. NME exporters thus could ap-
ply that rate to their production costs and determine a "fair" ex-
port price. Likewise, domestic producers could compare the NME's
estimated production costs with the constructed exchange rate to
determine possible dumping margins.1 5'
C. Anticompetition/Antitrust Issue
While an antidumping/antitrust comparison is beyond the scope
of this Article, the inconsistencies between the two policies must
be noted. Unlike the antitrust laws, antidumping laws allegedly
protect competitors rather than competition. 15 For example, in-
herent in the "fair" or "normal" price evaluation is the notion of a
base or floor price, below which an exporter will incur antidumping
charges. Moreover, antidumping laws do not distinguish between
truly predatory dumping and pro-competitive forms of dumping,
such as price-cutting.'53 Antitrust policies attack unfair competi-
tion while antidumping policies apparently attack "harmful"
competition.
I ld. at 819.
"4 See Didier, supra note 100, at 358.
"4 Id. at 359.
See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27, at 831.
151 Id.
6I See Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies Be Resolved?, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 339, 350 (1983).
153 Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Some problems and inconsistencies will, to one extent or an-
other, inherently arise in connection with United States and EEC
antidumping laws. A comprehensive or unified approach, however,
would strengthen the problematic areas. Most importantly, each
legislative body could improve its own laws by examining the ap-
proach of the other. For example, the conciseness and effectiveness
of the EEC Antidumping Regulation is admirable. The entire an-
tidumping regulation is contained in twelve pages. For a compara-
ble knowledge of the United States antidumping law, one must
delve through the Antidumping Act of 1921, Tariff Act, Trade
Agreements Act, Code of Federal Regulations, and recent case law.
Similarly, each body could borrow from the laws of the other
where needed-specifically, in defining such terms as "threat of in-
jury" and "material injury." Generally, the United States could
profit from examining the EEC Antidumping Regulation price un-
dertaking and provisional duties. Likewise, the EEC could benefit
from observing the United States escape clause, Heinz bill, and
case law.
For common, unresolved problems, the two legislative bodies
should consult to reach comprehensive, successful, and compatible
results. Such action is needed immediately regarding NME pricing
and inconvertible NME currencies. By acting independently, the
United States and EEC force exporters, particularly NME export-
ers, to address different and potentially inconsistent import regula-
tions. For the most part, United States and EEC antidumping laws
exhibit marked similarities. However, more efficient and effective
trade relations among the United States, EEC, and third countries
mandate continued cooperation and exchange.
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